Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. We identify rules of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not participating in the bilateral negotiation. Our main …nding is that the two central principles of GATT/WTO -non-discrimination (MFN) and reciprocity -preserve the welfare of non-participating governments and therefore o¤er a "…rst-line of defense" against bilateral opportunism. We argue that the GATT/WTO nulli…cation-or-impairment rule then constitutes an important "second-line of defense." Finally, we con…rm that in the absence of rules, or under weaker rules (e.g., MFN alone), the potential for bilateral opportunism can be severe.
Introduction
For over 50 years, GATT and now the WTO have successfully encouraged multilateral trade liberalization. This liberalization has been accomplished through a series of agreements negotiated among the member countries, and an important role of GATT/WTO has been to provide a continuous negotiating forum for this purpose. Each of these agreements amounts to a web of bilateral reciprocal exchanges of market access concessions between negotiating governments, secured by commitments to reduce tari¤s and other trade barriers, and "multilateralized" by the most-favored-nation (MFN) rule, which requires that each member o¤er to every other member access to its markets on non-discriminatory terms (see Jackson, 1969, pp. 217-248, or Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995, pp. 56-83) .
The liberalization that has been achieved through GATT/WTO negotiations is especially noteworthy in light of the fact that negotiations occur through time between the governments of various countries. This feature raises the possibility that the market access implied by existing tari¤ commitments may be altered by tari¤ commitments made at some point in the future. A particular concern is that the value of concessions that a government wins today may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. Taking the argument a step further, if governments recognize that current market access relations may be vulnerable to opportunistic bilateral agreements in the future, then they may exchange concessions with trepidation. A multilateral trade organization like the GATT/WTO is thus more likely to achieve its objectives, if it includes rules of negotiation that serve to protect the value of previous concessions won by governments that are not participating in current bilateral negotiations. As a general matter, then, it is important to ask: How e¤ective are the GATT/WTO principles that govern bilateral negotiations in protecting the welfare of non-participating governments? In this paper, we present a modeling framework within which to address this question, and we focus on three key GATT/WTO principles: non-discrimination, reciprocity and "nulli…cation or impairment."
The principle of non-discrimination is a …rst pillar of the GATT/WTO architecture. With certain exceptions (notably, preferential trading agreements, as allowed under GATT Article XXIV), this principle requires that tari¤ reductions achieved through a bilateral agreement are extended on an MFN basis to nonparticipants. Schwartz and Sykes (1997) consider the various costs and bene…ts of the MFN rule, and argue that the main bene…t is that it protects the value of concessions:
"More important, the MFN obligation protects the value of concessions against future erosion through discrimination. If country A receives a concession from country B and is not entitled to MFN treatment from B, then the value of the concession can be undermined if country B later makes an even better concession to country C on the same goods (or close substitutes). Faced with this uncertainty, country A would o¤er less for the concession in the …rst place (as would country B for the reciprocal concession), and fewer valuable deals would be struck. " (p. 62) While the MFN rule can clearly o¤er protection of this kind, it remains to determine formally whether this rule fully eliminates the opportunism problem.
The second pillar of the GATT/WTO architecture is the principle of reciprocity. Under this principle, negotiations result in tari¤ adjustments that generate for each participant an equal change in the volume of its imports and exports. This principle is often denounced as re ‡ecting unsound mercantilist reasoning. But in fact it can promote e¢cient trade agreements, as it serves to …x the world price between negotiating partners, so that neither partner experiences a termsof-trade loss when tari¤s are reciprocally liberalized.
The third rule that warrants attention here is the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule. GATT Dispute Panels have consistently recognized that the value of a tari¤ concession is the improved market access which it represents. Accordingly, when a government takes some action that nulli…es or impairs a previous concession made to some trading partner, that partner has a potentially legitimate basis from which to …le a complaint, even if no violation of GATT/WTO rules is alleged. The principle of reciprocity is represented in GATT/WTO practice in two ways. First, it is often associated with the broad manner in which government negotiators approach trade-policy negotiations. Second, it appears in GATT articles (e. g., GATT Article XXVIII) as a means of determining the "compensation" that may be sought when a trading partner modi…es or withdraws a previous concession. We discuss the history and legal representation of reciprocity in detail elsewhere (Bagwell and Staiger, 2000) . 2 This view is exempli…ed by the following excerpt from a GATT panel report (concerning the US non-violation complaint regarding EEC subsidies for domestic oilseed producers):
"...the main value of a tari¤ concession is that it provides an assurance of better market access through improved price competition. Contracting parties negotiate tari¤ concessions primarily to obtain that advantage. They must therefore be assumed to base their tari¤ negotiations on the expectation that the price e¤ect of the tari¤ concessions will not be systematically o¤set. If no right of redress were given to them in such a case, they would be reluctant to make tari¤ concessions and the General Agreement would no longer be useful as a legal framework for As Petersmann (1997) details, these complaints are handled under GATT Article XXIII, and the three conditions established by dispute panels for a successful "non-violation" complaint of this kind are that: (1). a reciprocal concession was negotiated between two trading partners; (2). a subsequent action was taken by one government, which, though consistent with GATT articles, adversely a¤ected the market access a¤orded to its trading partner; and (3). this action could not have been reasonably anticipated by this partner at the time of the negotiation of the original tari¤ concession. There are a variety of actions that have instigated complaints, including domestic subsidies, product re-classi…cations, changing regulatory regimes and bilateral trade negotiations with other partners. We focus on the latter possibility here. To assess the extent to which these rules prevent opportunistic bilateral agreements, we develop a general-equilibrium modeling framework in which a home country exports one good to two foreign countries in exchange for imports from them of a second good. We represent the objectives of each government as a general function of its local prices and terms of trade. This approach o¤ers two important advantages. First, it is very general, including both the traditional representation in which governments maximize national income and the recent political-economy formulations in which governments are also sensitive to distributional issues. Second, this representation clari…es the channel through which one government's tari¤ choices impose an externality on another government's welfare, making transparent both the means through which negotiating governments may appropriate the welfare of a non-participating government and the manner in which various rules of negotiation may limit this endeavor.
We then develop our analysis of the featured GATT/WTO rules in three steps. First, we consider whether the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination combine to ensure the preservation of the welfare of a non-participating government. This marks a useful initial step, since the potential for opportunistic bilateral agreements is surely eliminated, if participating governments are unable even to alter non-participant welfare.
In this regard, we begin with a theoretical perspective and establish that the welfare of the non-participating government is preserved if its country's terms incorporating the results of trade negotiations." (as quoted in Petersmann, 1997, p. 168) 3 Examples of bilateral agreements that have led to non-violation nulli…cation-or-impairment complaints are (i). the US complaint regarding tari¤ preferences negotiated by the EC on citrus products from certain Mediterranean countries, and (ii). the EC complaint regarding aspects of the bilateral agreement between the US and Japan concerning trade in semi-conductor products.
of trade (equivalently, export and import volumes) are unaltered. This …nding extends the logic of the well-known Kemp-Wan (1976) theorem to settings with politically motivated governments that construct bilateral (but not necessarily free-trade) agreements.
We next show that neither reciprocity nor non-discrimination is su¢cient, on its own, to preserve the welfare of the non-participating government. As our main …nding, however, we establish that the welfare of the non-participating government is preserved, when a bilateral agreement must honor reciprocity and non-discrimination. The principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination therefore eliminate the potential for opportunistic bilateral agreements. The intuition is remarkably simple. Reciprocity ensures that the terms of trade are …xed between the participating governments, and under non-discrimination this implies in turn that the non-participant's terms of trade are also preserved.
Having shown that the rigid application of reciprocity and MFN ensures the preservation of non-participant welfare and is thus su¢cient to preclude opportunistic bilateral agreements, we may still ask: Are these rules really necessary? Put di¤erently, if there were weaker, or even no, rules that governed bilateral negotiations, so that non-participant welfare could be altered, would there exist a permitted bilateral agreement that resulted in lower welfare for the nonparticipating government and higher welfare for each participating government? The examination of this issue constitutes the second step of our analysis.
To begin, we suppose that bilateral negotiations are conducted in the absence of rules. We illustrate that the potential for bilateral opportunism is then pervasive: starting from any initial set of e¢cient tari¤s, and holding …xed the tari¤ policy of foreign country j, the home country and foreign country i can always …nd a way to negotiate further changes in their tari¤s on each other's imports which bene…t them at the expense of country j. In this sense, when rules are absent, every e¢cient tari¤ vector is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism. The key point is that, by lowering the tari¤s that they apply to one another, the governments of the home country and foreign country i cause a terms of trade loss for foreign country j. The governments of the home country and foreign country i then convert this loss into their own gain.
As a general matter, we show that this maneuver cannot be stopped by a reciprocity rule alone: provided that discrimination is allowed, there exists a wide range of e¢cient tari¤s from which the home country and foreign country i can liberalize further in accordance with reciprocity and gain at the expense of country j. Hence, under the reciprocity rule, a signi…cant set of e¢cient tari¤s is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism.
Next, we consider the potential for bilateral opportunism under the MFN rule. We …nd that the MFN rule alone cannot o¤er a full remedy to the bilateral opportunism problem: for a wide range of initial MFN-e¢cient tari¤s, the home country and foreign country i can …nd a way to negotiate further changes in their tari¤s on each other's exports which bene…t them at the expense of country jeven when the home-country tari¤ cut is extended under the MFN rule to the nonparticipating foreign country j. Intuitively, the tari¤ reduction given by foreign country i raises the cost of home exports in foreign country j, and this negative e¤ect may overwhelm the bene…cial e¤ect of a reduced home tari¤ on exports from foreign country j. Under the MFN rule, therefore, a signi…cant set of MFNe¢cient tari¤s is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism. With the second step of our analysis, we thus con…rm that, while reciprocity and non-discrimination can together solve the bilateral opportunism problem, neither alone will su¢ce.
Finally, while we model MFN and reciprocity as formal and rigid rules, their application in GATT/WTO practice is more quali…ed. This brings us to the third and …nal step of our analysis: we consider whether the nulli…cation-orimpairment rule might provide a separate defense against bilateral opportunism, even when the reciprocity and MFN rules are not imposed. To this end, we propose a de…nition of market access and show that this is the case: starting from an e¢cient set of tari¤s, any bilateral agreement that is attractive to the home country and foreign country i would violate the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule. We therefore provide a formal basis from which to interpret the nulli…cation-orimpairment rule as playing a potentially important role in solving the bilateral opportunism problem. But the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule would by itself be a cumbersome solution to a (pervasive) problem. With this observation in mind, we propose that MFN and reciprocity be understood in GATT/WTO practice as providing a "…rst line of defense" against the problem of bilateral opportunism, thereby reducing the number of valid non-violation complaints and easing the judicial burden of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures. The ability of governments to bring non-violation nulli…cation-or-violation complaints then serves an important role as a "second line of defense" against this problem.
4
This paper builds on our previous work. In Staiger (1999a, 2001a) , we represent each government's objective as a general function of its local prices and terms of trade, and we establish that the principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity can promote e¢cient trade agreements, by neutralizing the termsof-trade implications of trade-policy changes.
5 In Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) , we extend the framework to include labor and environmental standards, and we analyze the extent to which the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule guards against a regulatory race-to-the-bottom. The innovation of the present paper is that we introduce and study the bilateral opportunism problem. We establish that the principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity and the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule o¤er important protection against opportunistic bilateral agreements.
This paper is also related to an important literature in Industrial Organization that considers multi-party negotiations and the protection against opportunistic behavior that di¤erent legal rules o¤er. 6 We demonstrate here that a related concern arises in the context of trade-policy negotiations, and we identify and evaluate the protection o¤ered by key GATT rules.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 contains the welfare-preservation …ndings. Section 4 characterizes e¢cient tari¤s in discriminatory environments, identi…es in the no-rules case a severe bilateral opportunism problem, and shows that reciprocity alone does not provide a general solution to this problem. Section 5 considers an MFN environment and con…rms that, without further rules, the problem of bilateral opportunism remains. Section 6 shows that the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule can in principle provide a separate defense against the bilateral opportunism problem. Section 7 concludes. and then concludes his review of the 14 dispute settlement reports examining non-violation complaints as follows: "...These panel reports illustrated that the non-violation complaints can strengthen the function of GATT, as well as of the WTO, as a negotiating forum by o¤ering additional safeguards against the impairment of...market access commitments through unforeseen subsequent policy measures that are not prohibited by GATT/WTO law." (p. 171).
5 Given the central role played by the MFN rule in the GATT/WTO, there is surprisingly little formal analysis of this rule. For additional perspectives, see Bagwell and Staiger (1999b) , Caplin and Krishna (1991) , Choi (1995) , Ludema (1991) and McCalman (1997) . None of these papers consider the bilateral opportunism problem. Ethier (1998) independently raises some of the issues treated here. Horn and Mavroidis (2001) o¤er an excellent survey of research that addresses the economic aspects of the MFN rule.
6 For example, McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and Segal (1999) consider the scope for bilateral opportunism, when a single seller contracts separately with di¤erent buyers. Non-discrimination clauses may mitigate against the bilateral opportunism problem.
The Model
In this section, we describe a two-good general-equilibrium model of trade between three countries. 7 We present as well a general set of preferences for governments that allows for both economic and political considerations.
The Economic Environment
We assume that there is one home country and two foreign countries who trade two goods, x and y, that are normal goods in consumption and produced under conditions of increasing opportunity costs. Production takes place under perfect competition, facing tari¤s on imports by each country. To simplify the exposition of our …ndings, we suppose that each foreign country trades only with the home country, who imports x from each of its two foreign trading partners in exchange for exports of y. The home country is thus the only country that has the opportunity to set discriminatory tari¤s across its trading partners. 8 We now introduce price notation. The home local relative price is denoted as p´p x =p y , where p x (p y ) is the local price of good x (y) in the home country. Similarly, the local relative price in foreign country i is denoted as p ¤i´p¤i x =p ¤i y for i = 1,2. The ad valorem tari¤ that the home country places on imports of x from foreign country i is denoted as t i , for i= 1,2, and t ¤i is the ad valorem tari¤ levied by foreign country i on imports of y from the home country.
9 Throughout, we assume that these tari¤s are non-prohibitive. We de…ne the "world" (i.e., untaxed) relative price for trade between the home country and foreign country i as p wi´p¤i x =p y : This is the ratio of exporter prices for trade between the home country and foreign country i. It is important to observe that world prices are linked across bilateral trading relationships:
One possibility is that the tari¤ policy of the home country is non-discriminatory (i.e., the home country adopts MFN tari¤s). In this case, we have that
and hence there is a single world price: p wi´pw for i = 1,2. On the other hand, if the home country discriminates with its tari¤ policy, then ¿ 1 6 = ¿ 2 and hence there are di¤erent world prices: p w1 6 = p w2 : Finally, we note that the terms of trade for foreign country i are given simply as p wi : We next introduce notation for import and export volumes in each country. For foreign country i, imports of y and exports of x are denoted as M ¤i (p ¤i ; p wi ) and E ¤i (p ¤i ; p wi ), respectively: These functions represent di¤erences between production and consumption in foreign country i, where production depends upon the local price while consumption is determined by the local price and also tari¤ revenue, where tari¤ revenue can itself be expressed as a function of the local price and the terms of trade.
The home country has multiple trading partners, with whom it may experience di¤erent terms of trade. Once again, domestic production depends upon the local price while domestic consumption is determined by the local price and tari¤ revenue. But the determination of tari¤ revenue is now more complex: if the home country's tari¤s are discriminatory, then its tari¤ revenue depends upon the total volume of x that it imports and the composition of this volume across the foreign trading partners. As we show in the Appendix, we may again express tari¤ revenue in terms of the local price and the terms of trade, once the domestic country's multilateral terms of trade is appropriately de…ned as a trade-weighted average of the set of bilateral world prices:
where
With this de…nition, home-country imports of x and exports of y may be denoted as M(p; T ) and E(p; T ); respectively. Henceforth, we refer to T simply as the home country's terms of trade. 10 Using (2.1), if the home country adopts an MFN tari¤ policy, then T = p wi´pw ; however, a discriminatory tari¤ policy implies that T 6 = p wi for all i. Next, we consider the trade balance and market-clearing conditions. Home and foreign budget constraints imply that, for any prices, we have
We now suppose that the vector of tari¤s,
, is given, and we consider the determination of the world prices. One restriction on world prices is given by the market-clearing requirement:
Combining the market-clearing requirement (2.4) with the linkage condition (2.1), we thus have two restrictions with which to determine the two equilibrium world prices as functions of the given tari¤s. We represent the equilibrium world prices as e p wi (¿ ) for i = 1; 2, and we assume that they are uniquely determined as functions of the four tari¤s. Notice that market clearing in the y market is assured by (2.2) and (2.3). Summarizing, with their selections of tari¤s, governments determine the equilibrium world prices; in turn, the tari¤s and equilibrium world prices imply equilibrium values for all local prices, so that equilibrium import and export volumes are determined as well.
Prices and Tari¤s
It is convenient now to present some basic assumptions that we maintain throughout the paper. We begin with the manner in which tari¤s a¤ect prices. We consider both the possibility that the home country is able to set discriminatory tari¤s and the possibility that home tari¤s must conform to the MFN rule.
Beginning with the discriminatory case, we impose the following assumptions: (i). e p w1 is increasing in ¿ 2 ; ¿ ¤1 and ¿ ¤2 and is decreasing in ¿ 1 ; and (ii). e p w2 10 Observe that T is in fact a measure of the reciprocal of domestic terms of trade: an improvement in the domestic country's terms of trade corresponds to a lower value for T . is increasing in ¿ 1 ; ¿ ¤1 and ¿ ¤2 and is decreasing in ¿ 2 : Thus, if foreign country i confronts a higher tari¤ on its exports, then it experiences a reduction in its terms of trade. On the other hand, if foreign country i raises its own tari¤, or if the other countries raise tari¤s on one another, then foreign country i experiences an improvement in its terms of trade. These restrictions direct attention to the "standard" case, ensuring that our model does not succumb to the Lerner paradox.
Next, we consider the case in which the home country selects among MFN tari¤s:
In this event, we may represent the equilibrium world price as e p w (¿ ; ¿ ¤1 ; ¿ ¤2 ). Our assumption for this case is: e p w is increasing in ¿
¤1
and ¿ ¤2 and is decreasing in ¿ . As above, when foreign country i raises its own import tari¤, or when foreign country j pursues a more protectionist policy, foreign country i experiences a terms of trade improvement. We assume further that an increase in the home (MFN) tari¤ results in an improvement in the home-country terms of trade.
Government Preferences
We next o¤er a general representation of government preferences. We equip government decision-makers with preferences that allow for a wide range of economic and political motivations. In particular, we represent the objectives of the home and foreign governments by the general functions W (p; T ) and W ¤i (p ¤i ; e p wi ) for i = 1,2, where all prices and terms of trade are evaluated at their market-clearing levels. The basic assumption that we maintain is that, with local prices held …xed, each government strictly prefers an improvement in its terms of trade: @W (p; T )=@T < 0 and @W ¤i (p ¤i ; e p wi )=@p wi > 0. To understand this assumption, it is useful to refer to Figure 1 . There, we depict combinations of ¿ i and ¿ ¤i that preserve the relative local price in foreign country i and the world price between it and the home country. Given the relationships between prices and tari¤s detailed above, the iso-world-price locus is positively sloped. For this illustration, we suppose further that an increase in ¿ ¤i results in a decrease in the local relative price in this country. 11 Now, let us suppose that we begin at point A. If the home country were to raise ¿ i at the same time that foreign country i were to lower ¿ ¤i , with the respective tari¤ changes undertaken in a fashion that preserved p ¤i , then we would arrive at point B. Notice that the world price e p wi is lower at point B: our assumption that @W ¤i (p ¤i ; e p wi )=@p wi > 0 simply means that the implied income redistribution from 11 In other words, local relative prices do not succumb to the Metzler paradox.
foreign country i to the home country (associated with the movement from A to B) results in a loss of welfare for the government of foreign country i. We emphasize that, as preferences over local prices are left unrestricted, this representation of government preferences is very general. It includes the standard possibility that governments maximize national income as well as the possibility that governments are motivated by distributional concerns. As we detail in our earlier work (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999a) , the leading political-economy models of trade policy can all be captured within this formulation. 
Welfare Preservation
An important issue concerns the extent to which GATT/WTO rules prevent an opportunistic bilateral agreement. In this section, we take a …rst step in the investigation of this issue, by identifying rules on bilateral negotiations that preserve the welfare of the non-participating government. We also relate these rules to GATT/WTO practice.
Formally, we focus here on the following problem. Starting from an initial set of tari¤s, ¿ I´( ¿ ) denote the local price in foreign country j under the initial (new) set of tari¤s. We seek rules on the manner that ¿ N may be derived from ¿ I and under which the welfare of the non-participating government is unaltered:
Terms of Trade
It might be expected that a welfare-preservation rule could be de…ned only with reference to the particular preferences held by the government of foreign country j. This is not the case, however, as the following proposition con…rms:
Proposition 1 (Welfare Preservation: Terms of Trade): Any bilateral agreement between the governments of the home country and foreign country i that leaves unaltered foreign country j 's terms of trade also preserves the welfare of the government of foreign country j . 
The problem of non-participant welfare preservation thus may be recast in terms of the preservation of the non-participant's world price. We argue next that the problem equivalently may be recast in terms of the preservation of the non-participant's export and import volumes. Speci…cally, we observe that the bilateral negotiation preserves foreign country j's terms of trade (e p wj I = e p wj N ) if and only if it preserves foreign country j's export and import volumes: Proposition 2 (Welfare Preservation: Export and Import Volumes): Any bilateral agreement between the governments of the home country and foreign country i that leaves unaltered foreign country j 's export and import volumes equivalently leaves unaltered foreign country j 's terms of trade and thus also preserves the welfare of the government of foreign country j . Kemp and Wan (1976) make related observations, although they restrict attention to governments that maximize national income and negotiate bilaterally to free trade. As others have noted in this context, the practical merit of a rule that calls for world-price maintenance is not obvious.
13 Such a rule might require subtle adjustments in the tari¤ that the home country applies to exports from the non-participating country. At this point, Propositions 1 and 2 are best understood as o¤ering theoretical insights that inform our search for welfare-preservation rules that have a …rm grounding in GATT/WTO practice.
Reciprocity and MFN
Two of the central pillars of the GATT/WTO approach are the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination. We consider now the extent to which these principles protect the welfare of a non-participating government.
We begin with the principle of reciprocity. Following our earlier work (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999a Staiger, , 2001a , we say that a bilateral negotiation between the governments of the home country and foreign country i conforms to the principle of reciprocity whenever for each of these countries the change in the volume of its imports is of equal value to the change in the volume of its exports, where changes in trade volumes are valued at the existing world price. For foreign country i, the principle of reciprocity thus requires that:
We now record an important property of reciprocity:
Lemma 1. Any bilateral agreement between the governments of the home country and foreign country i that satis…es the principle of reciprocity leaves unaltered the terms of trade between these countries.
The proof is simple. Since foreign country i's trade balance condition must hold at the initial tari¤s, we may apply (2.3) to (3.2) and restate the reciprocity require-
But foreign country i's trade balance requirement must hold also at the new tari¤s, and so it follows that e p wi I = e p wi N : Any bilateral negotiation that satis…es the principle of reciprocity thus preserves the world price between the negotiating governments. But the principle of reciprocity does not, on its own, ensure that the welfare of the non-participating government is preserved. Reciprocity …xes the world price e p wi ; whereas the welfare of the government of foreign country j is preserved when the world price e p wj is …xed. Similarly, the principle of non-discrimination does not, on its own, su¢ce to preserve the welfare of the non-participating government. As mentioned in Section 2, under the MFN requirement, the government of the home country sets a single tari¤ on both of its trading partners, and a single world price, e p w k´e p w1 k = e p w2 k , where k = I; N, is thus determined. But the governments of the home country and foreign country i could potentially engage in a bilateral negotiation that changes this world price: e p w N 6 = e p w I . In this case, their bilateral negotiation could alter the welfare of the government of foreign country j.
Finally, suppose that the bilateral negotiation between the governments of the home country and foreign country i must satisfy both the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination. Then, reciprocity …xes the world price between the negotiating countries; which under the MFN requirement ensures as well that the non-participant's world price is …xed.
Proposition 3 (Welfare Preservation: Reciprocity and MFN): Any bilateral agreement between the governments of the home country and foreign country i that satis…es the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination leaves unaltered foreign country j 's terms of trade and therefore preserves the welfare of the government of foreign country j .
In e¤ect, reciprocity and MFN work in tandem to maintain the export and import volumes of the non-participating country. As noted above, an explicit volume-preservation rule could be cumbersome, as it is suggestive of subtle adjustments in the tari¤ that the home government applies to the non-participant. By contrast, the MFN restriction serves as a simple means by which to "multilateralize" bilateral negotiations, and, remarkably, reciprocity then ensures that the multilateral presence so achieved preserves non-participant welfare.
Remaining Issues
To this point, we have focused on rules for bilateral negotiation that preserve the welfare of a non-participating government. The tandem rules of reciprocity and non-discrimination have this welfare-preservation property, and they are therefore su¢cient to preclude opportunistic bilateral agreements. An important remaining issue concerns the probable extent to which these rules are necessary.
Our investigation of this issue constitutes the second step in our analysis. We proceed by asking two questions. First, in the absence of any rules for bilateral negotiation, would there exist bilateral agreements that lower the welfare of the non-participating government and are attractive to the participating governments? In other words, how signi…cant is the bilateral opportunism problem, anyway? Second, even if the problem is signi…cant in the absence of rules, might it nevertheless be solved with "weak" rules (i.e., rules that do not go so far as to ensure the preservation of non-participant welfare)? For instance, as Schwartz and Sykes (1997) suggest, it seems plausible that the principle of non-discrimination would constitute an e¤ective solution to any such problem. But does it? In particular, if any bilateral negotiation were required only to honor the MFN rule, would there exist bilateral agreements that lower the welfare of the non-participating government and are attractive to the participating governments?
Conclusive answers to these questions are beyond the reach of any single model. As a general matter, the bene…ts to a bilateral agreement may be in ‡uenced by the position of the initial tari¤s and by the participants' beliefs regarding the possible responses and/or agreements that a non-participating government might pursue in the future.
14 Nevertheless, we may gain some insight by characterizing the e¢ciency frontier, positioning the initial tari¤s on this frontier, specifying the rules (if any) that govern bilateral negotiations, and then asking: Does there exist a permitted bilateral agreement for the governments of the home country and any foreign country i under which they each gain, when they take as …xed the tari¤ policy of foreign country j?
A convenient feature of this approach is that, if such an agreement does exist, then it is assuredly opportunistic: starting at the e¢ciency frontier, the participating governments can gain only if the non-participating government is harmed. A limitation is that the non-participant's eventual response to the bilateral agreement is not modeled. On net, we believe that this approach represents a useful beginning towards an understanding of the potential signi…cance of the bilateral opportunism problem when rules are absent or weak.
15
14 A complete analysis would therefore specify the determination of the initial tari¤s and the dynamic process through which coalitions endogenously form. The ideal modeling framework would be a repeated game, since trade agreements must be self enforcing, that allows for endogenous coalition formation over time. At present, however, there is no widely accepted theory of endogenous coalition formation among farsighted players. For di¤erent perspectives, see Bloch (1996) , Chwe (1994 ), Ferreira (1999 , Gomes (1999) and Ray and Vohra (1999) . We note, too, that recent work in contracting theory (e.g., McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and Segal (1999) ) explores the scope for bilateral opportunism, for settings in which binding contracts can be written and any bargaining sequence across players is exogenously given.
15 A speci…c game that can provide formal justi…cation for our focus is the following. Let us begin from an e¢cient vector of tari¤s, which forms the status quo, and specify the rules (if any) that govern bilateral negotiations. Then in stage 1, the home government makes each foreign government i an o¤er (¿ i ; ¿ ¤i ) which is privately observed by foreign government i. In stage 2, each foreign government simultaneously decides whether to accept or reject, holding "passive beliefs" about the o¤er faced by the other foreign government (McAfee and Schwartz, 1994) . It can be shown that the outcome of this game under the rules of negotiation associated with each of the Propositions 5, 6, 8 and 9 that follow will share the e¢ciency properties suggested by each proposition. This interpretation builds from Segal's (1999) analysis of contracting with
Discriminatory Environments
We start with a permissive setting, in which discriminatory tari¤s are allowed.
Government Preferences in Reduced Form
To begin, we represent government welfare in reduced form as a direct function of tari¤s. Let c W (¿ )´W (p; T ) and c
; where all prices and terms of trade are evaluated at their market-clearing levels.
We now strengthen our basic assumptions slightly, so as to focus on tari¤s for which externalities can be unambiguously signed:
Assumption 1 (Externalities): We restrict attention to tari¤s for which, for i; j=1,2 and i 6 = j :
Thus, we will consider initial tari¤s that rest on the e¢ciency frontier at a point where (i) each government would prefer to unilaterally raise its tari¤; (ii) each government experiences a welfare reduction when its export good is confronted with a higher tari¤ from a trading partner; and (iii) foreign government i is pleased when either the home government raises its tari¤ on the exports of foreign country j or foreign government j raises its tari¤ on the exports of the home country. These relationships follow directly from the model of Section 2, so long as government welfare at the initial tari¤s is su¢ciently sensitive to the terms-of-trade change that an adjustment in tari¤s would imply. We further note that Assumption 1 directs attention to the set of e¢cient trade agreements that are suggested by the nature of GATT tari¤ bindings. The essential legal commitment associated with GATT bindings is that governments agree not to raise their tari¤s above bound levels. It would be di¢cult to reconcile the value that governments evidently place on such commitments with points on the e¢ciency frontier that did not satisfy assumptions (i) and (ii). And using the model of Section 2, it can be shown that assumption (iii) is in fact implied by (ii). 16 In addition, these assumptions yield a negotiation environment in which externalities. 16 This can be seen by noting that the impact of a change in ¿ ¤j or ¿ j on the welfare of foreign country i travels through e p wi , as does the impact on the welfare of foreign country i of a change each government views a tari¤ reduction on its part as a "concession" that is potentially appealing if a trading partner "reciprocates" with a tari¤ reduction of its own, in line with the behavior often attributed to government trade-policy negotiators (see, e.g., Krugman (1991 Krugman ( , 1997 
We omit a formal analysis of this program, as the solution may be easily characterized with the assistance of some simple …gures. We begin with a characterization of the e¢cient tari¤s:
Proposition 4 (E¢cient Tari¤s): If ¿ e is an e¢cient vector of tari¤s, then for i; j =1,2 and i 6 = j, we must have that
To interpret the characterization, we refer to Figure 2 . With ¿ i on the vertical axis and ¿ ¤i on the horizontal axis, we observe …rst that the iso-welfare curve for in ¿ i . Our assumptions relating tari¤s to equilibrium world prices are then su¢cient to establish that (ii) implies (iii). 17 While there is broad agreement that negotiators appear to behave in this way, there is less agreement over whether this behavior makes economic sense. See, e.g., Krugman (1991 Krugman ( , 1997 who argues that it does not. Our point here is simply that, within the model developed in Section 2, there is a set of e¢cient trade agreements consistent with this behavior, and these are the only trade agreements that are consistent as well with the basic structure of GATT tari¤ bindings. This interpretation is developed more fully in Staiger (1999a, 2001a) . the home-country government is positively sloped over the relevant region. This simply re ‡ects that the home government trades o¤ a higher own tari¤ (which is good) against a higher tari¤ from foreign country i (which is bad) when the home-country government's welfare is held …xed. The iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country i is positively sloped for the same reason. Second, we observe that the iso-welfare curve for the government of foreign country j is negatively sloped, since it bene…ts from an increase in either tari¤. Third, we observe that the home-government iso-welfare curve is steeper than that of foreign government i at the e¢cient point, and so an e¢cient tari¤ vector leaves a lens in which the governments of the home country and foreign country i could experience welfare gains. We note that the lens lies below the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j.
To understand the location of the lens, it is instructive to entertain the opposite possibility in which the lens lies above the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j. If this were the case, then it would be possible to raise the two tari¤s in a way that o¤ered gains to all three governments. The governments of the home country and foreign country i could obviously gain from such a maneuver. Moreover, when these governments impose higher tari¤s on each other's exports, foreign country j experiences a terms-of-trade gain, and under Assumption 1 this results in a welfare improvement for the government of this country. A more subtle possibility is that there is no lens: the iso-welfare curves of the governments of the home country and foreign country i are tangent at the point at which they intersect the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j. This arrangement fails to solve Program W as well, but a more involved alteration of tari¤s is now required to produce Pareto improvements. For example, raising ¿ i and ¿ ¤i along the iso-welfare curve of foreign country i will cause the home-country government to experience a second-order welfare loss, while generating a …rst-order welfare bene…t for the government of foreign country j. Adjustments to ¿ j and ¿ ¤j can then be found that ensure gains for all three governments.
18 Therefore, if the 18 In the tangency case, the welfares of the governments of the home country and foreign country j can be increased while maintaining the welfare of the government of foreign country i if we adjust tari¤s according to the following procedure: (i). increase ¿ i and ¿ ¤i so as to preserve c W ¤i ; thereby creating a second-order loss (…rst-order gain) for c W ( c W ¤j ); (ii). raise ¿ j and lower ¿ ¤j so as to preserve c W ¤i , thereby creating a …rst-order gain (…rst-order loss) for c W ( c W ¤j ); and (iii). ensure that the …rst adjustment is large as compared to the second, thereby creating a net gain for c W ¤j . Speci…cally, with subscripts denoting partial derivatives, it su¢ces to pick tari¤ changes that satisfy:
vector of tari¤s is e¢cient, then the lens indeed must lie below the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j, as depicted in Figure 2 .
Bilateral Opportunism
Starting with an e¢cient tari¤ vector, we now consider the possibility of a bilateral agreement in which the governments of the home country and some foreign country i adjust the tari¤s under their control, (¿ i ,¿ j ) and ¿ ¤i . For a given set of rules for bilateral negotiations, we say that an initial e¢cient tari¤ vector is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism if there exists a foreign country i and a permitted bilateral agreement between this country and the home country such that the governments of the home country and foreign country i both gain. We establish next that the bilateral opportunism problem is potentially severe: without strong rules, all e¢cient tari¤ vectors are vulnerable to bilateral opportunism.
This conclusion follows immediately when there are no rules that govern bilateral negotiations. In that case, the home government could raise ¿ j as part of its bilateral negotiation with the government of foreign country i; furthermore, under Assumption 1, the home government and the government of foreign country i would both gain when the home government raises ¿ j . Thus, in the absence of any rules governing bilateral negotiations, all e¢cient tari¤ vectors are vulnerable to bilateral opportunism.
As noted above, however, a tari¤ concession made in a previous GATT agreement is "bound," and the tari¤ therefore cannot be raised above its bound level in a subsequent negotiation, unless the trading partner on whose exports the bound tari¤ applies is represented. This binding restriction eliminates the potential of the home government to raise ¿ j as part of its bilateral agreement with the government of foreign country i. Does the binding restriction su¢ce to eliminate the bilateral opportunism problem?
At this point we may refer to our characterization of the e¢ciency frontier in Figure 2 . We then see that the binding restriction fails to eliminate the bilateral opportunism problem. The governments of the home country and foreign country i can still gain by lowering the tari¤s that they apply to one another (i.e., by moving into the lens):
Proposition 5 (Bindings and E¢cient Tari¤s): Whether or not a bind-
ings restriction is imposed, every e¢cient tari¤ vector is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism.
As Figure 2 indicates, the key point is that, by lowering the tari¤s that they apply to one another, the governments of the home country and foreign country i cause a terms-of-trade loss for foreign country j. In e¤ect, the governments of the home country and foreign country i convert this loss into their own gain, thereby rendering vulnerable any e¢cient tari¤s, even when the tari¤ that the home government applies to exports from foreign country j is bound. Would the principle of reciprocity block an opportunistic bilateral agreement of this kind? Recall from Lemma 1 that a bilateral agreement between the governments of the home country and foreign country i that satis…es the principle of reciprocity must leave unaltered the terms of trade between these two countries. It is thus evident from Figure 2 that the principle of reciprocity will fail to block an opportunistic agreement between the home country and foreign country i if and only if the (positively sloped) iso-e p wi locus passing through the e¢cient point in Figure 2 enters the lens. As can be understood from Figure 2 , when this is the case, both the home-country government and the government of foreign country i seek lower tari¤s and greater trade volume at the given terms of trade between these two countries. Hence we have:
Proposition 6 (Reciprocity and E¢cient Tari¤s): Under bindings and the principle of reciprocity, an e¢cient tari¤ vector is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism if and only if there exists i 2 f1; 2g such that the home-country government and the government of foreign country i seek lower tari¤s and greater trade volume at the given terms of trade between them.
As Proposition 6 con…rms, in the absence of an MFN rule, the principle of reciprocity can solve the bilateral opportunism problem at points on the e¢ciency frontier at which, for each bilateral relationship, one of the two governments would seek a (weakly) higher tari¤ and less trade volume at the given terms of trade between them. But at any point on the e¢ciency frontier where this condition is not met, there will exist a foreign government i with whom the home government can engage in opportunistic reciprocal liberalization. Through their liberalization, the government of foreign country i receives a bene…cial increase in trade volume at a …xed terms of trade between it and the home country. The home government also bene…ts, and its bene…t is made possible by the implied reduction in e p wj (i.e., the terms-of-trade improvement against foreign country j).
Hence, when the principle of reciprocity is applied in a discriminatory environment, the bilateral opportunism problem remains for a signi…cant set of points on the e¢ciency frontier. But might instead MFN alone su¢ce? We take this up in the next section.
Non-discriminatory Environment
We consider now the situation in which both the initial tari¤s and the tari¤s associated with any future bilateral negotiation must conform to the MFN rule. This rule alters both the e¢ciency frontier and the incentives for bilateral opportunism.
Government Preferences in Reduced Form
When the home government is restricted by the MFN requirement, the total number of tari¤s is reduced to three: ¿´¿ 1 = ¿ 2 ; ¿ ¤1 and ¿ ¤2 : For this situation, we may de…ne the reduced-form preferences for governments as follows:
; where all prices and terms of trade are evaluated at their marketclearing levels. That is, W and W ¤i are simply c W and c W ¤i , respectively, with the MFN constraint ¿´¿ 1 = ¿ 2 imposed. Recall from Section 2 that, under the MFN restriction, there will now be a single world price, and so we also have that T = e p wi´e p w : In analogy with Assumption 1 for discriminatory tari¤ environments, we now strengthen our basic assumptions, so as to focus on MFN tari¤s for which externalities can be unambiguously signed:
Assumption 1' (Externalities: MFN): We restrict attention to tari¤s for which, for i; j=1,2 and i 6 = j : (i). @W =@¿ > 0 and @W ¤i =@¿ ¤i > 0; (ii). @W =@¿ ¤i < 0 and @W ¤i =@¿ < 0; and
Thus, we consider negotiated MFN tari¤s at which each government would prefer to unilaterally raise its tari¤, each government experiences a welfare reduction when its export good is confronted with a higher tari¤ from a trading partner, and foreign government i is pleased when foreign government j raises its tari¤ on the exports of the home country. Again, this assumption directs attention to (MFN-e¢cient) tari¤s at which the welfare consequences of tari¤ changes are consistent with their terms-of-trade e¤ects and with the nature of GATT bindings.
Characterization of MFN-E¢cient Tari¤s
We now characterize the set of tari¤s that are e¢cient in the MFN class. The e¢cient tari¤s characterized in the previous section for which ¿ 1 = ¿ 2 are of course also e¢cient in the MFN class, but a tari¤ vector that is e¢cient in the MFN class need not be e¢cient in the full class of (discriminatory) tari¤ vectors. We continue to denote the vector of tari¤s by ¿´(¿ ; ¿ ¤1 ; ¿ ¤2 ), noting that in this MFN environment ¿ now has three elements. As compared to the characterization of e¢cient tari¤s when discrimination is allowed, the lack of two independent home-country tari¤s under the restriction of MFN complicates somewhat the characterization of the set of MFN-e¢cient tari¤s. Consequently, while we continue to rely heavily on a series of …gures to illustrate the main points, we provide a formal analysis of this program in the Appendix. We establish there that:
Proposition 7 (MFN-E¢cient Tari¤s): If ¿ m is an MFN-e¢cient vector of tari¤s, then for i; j =1,2 and i 6 = j, either:
With ¿ on the vertical axis and ¿ ¤i on the horizontal axis, Figures 3A, 3B and 3C depict the implications of conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 7, respectively. Each …gure re ‡ects, at the e¢cient point, the ranking of the isowelfare-curve slopes of the three governments which is implied by the associated condition (all slopes are positive by Assumption 1'). The three cases are organized on the basis of whether the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j 6 = i is steeper than (case (i)), ‡atter than (case (ii)), or tangent to (case (iii)) the iso-welfare curve of the home government. The essential content of Proposition 7 may be seen with the aid of these …gures, once it is observed that, in (¿ , ¿ ¤i ) space, the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j 6 = i is also the iso-e p w locus, and that any movement to the right of this locus raises e p w or equivalently (by Assumption 1') bene…ts the government of foreign country j.
As a consequence, in case (i) the government of the home country seeks a higher tari¤ and less trade volume, given the world price (i.e., moving along the iso-welfare curve of foreign government j), with its preferred outcome for the given world price occurring at the point of tangency H in Figure 3A . As we demonstrate in the Appendix, e¢ciency then requires that each foreign country would gain from lowering its tari¤ and achieving more trade volume, if the world price were …xed. Similarly, in case (ii) the government of the home country seeks a lower tari¤ and more trade volume, given the world price (i.e., moving along the iso-welfare curve of foreign government j), with its preferred outcome for the given world price occurring at the point of tangency L in Figure 3B , and e¢ciency then requires that each foreign country seek a higher tari¤ and less trade volume at the given world price. Finally, in case (iii) the government of the home country achieves its preferred trade volume given the world price, and e¢ciency requires that at least one foreign government also achieve its preferred trade volume.
The downward lens in Figure 3A can be understood intuitively as follows. If the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j 6 = i is steeper than the iso-welfare curve of the home government (case (i)), then an upward lens between the home government and the government of foreign country i would have to contain, or lie to the right of, the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j. But this would not be compatible with e¢ciency, because it would then be feasible to move into the lens and bene…t all three governments. The absence of a lens (i.e., a tangency) between the home government and the government of foreign country i is also incompatible with e¢ciency in case (i).
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The upward lens described in Figure 3B can be similarly understood. If the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j 6 = i is ‡atter than the isowelfare curve of the home government (case (ii)), then a downward lens between the home government and the government of foreign country i would have to contain, or lie to the right of, the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j. But again, this would not be compatible with e¢ciency, because it would then be feasible to move into the lens and bene…t all three governments. The absence of a lens between the home government and the government of foreign country i is also incompatible with e¢ciency in case (ii).
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Finally, if the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j 6 = i is tangent to the iso-welfare curve of the home government (case (iii)), then the home government achieves its preferred trade volume at the given world price, and the presence of a lens between the home government and the government of foreign country i no longer signals the possibility of Pareto-improving tari¤ changes. As a consequence, each of the possibilities illustrated in Figure C (a downward lens, an upward lens, or no lens at all) can arise at points on the e¢ciency frontier. To see this, consider why the downward-lens case (illustrated in the top panel of Figure  3C ) cannot be improved upon. In this case, the government of foreign country i seeks a lower tari¤ and greater trade volume at the given world price. A natural candidate for generating a Pareto improvement would be to …rst reduce ¿ and ¿ ¤i slightly along the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j, creating a …rst-order gain for the government of foreign country i and a second-order loss for the home government. The problem is, there are not su¢cient instruments to then undo the home government's second-order loss, because the government of foreign country j cannot receive a lower world price without su¤ering a welfare decline, while the home government must receive a lower world price if its second- 19 To see this, hypothesize a tangency and consider the following two-step procedure. First, increase ¿ and ¿ ¤i slightly along the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country i, creating a …rst-order gain for the government of foreign country j (via the rise in e p w ) and a second-order loss for the home government. Second, raise ¿ and ¿ ¤j slightly along the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country i (i.e., along the new iso-e p w locus), so as to eliminate the second-order welfare loss while preserving a …rst-order welfare gain for the government of foreign country j (recall that this is the direction preferred by the home government in case (i)). This two-step procedure would yield a Pareto improvement over the initial tari¤s, and hence the absence of a lens between the home government and the government of foreign country i is also incompatible with e¢ciency in case (i). 20 This can be seen by considering the two-step procedure described in note 19, with the direction of tari¤ movements reversed.
order loss is to be o¤set (while maintaining a …rst-order gain for the government of foreign country j). Hence, no Pareto improvement is possible.
Observe that the bottom panel of Figure 3C depicts the case in which all governments are content with the trade volumes achieved at the given world prices. There is thus no lens in this case. The tari¤s that support such an arrangement are of special interest, as they correspond to the tari¤s that governments would choose were they to "ignore" any terms-of-trade e¤ects of their tari¤ choices. Further, in the special case in which governments maximize national income, these tari¤s correspond to multilateral free trade. In Staiger (1999a, 2001a) , we interpret these tari¤s in greater detail, and we refer to the MFN-tari¤ vector at which each government achieves its preferred trade volume given the world price as the MFN politically optimal tari¤s. We follow that convention here as well.
Bilateral Opportunism
We now consider the circumstances under which an initial vector of MFN-e¢cient tari¤s is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism, when the bilateral agreement must honor the MFN rule.
Consider …rst Figure 3A . In this case, the MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vector is vulnerable, as the home government and the government of foreign country i can negotiate a further reduction in ¿ and ¿ ¤i which yields a Pareto gain for them (i.e., moves them into the lens in Figure 3A ) at the expense of the government of foreign country j, who su¤ers a terms-of-trade decline. Hence, for MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vectors at which the home government seeks a higher tari¤ and reduced trade volume at the given world price, there is a bilateral opportunism problem. Notice, too, that this problem remains when the bilateral negotiations must honor the MFN rule as well as a bindings requirement.
This case is of some special interest. The government of foreign country j is harmed, even though it does not alter its own tari¤ and receives a nondiscriminatory tari¤ reduction from the home country. And the governments of foreign country i and the home country are able to convert this loss into their own gain. Intuitively, foreign country j is harmed by a deterioration in its terms of trade: the tari¤ reduction given by foreign country i raises the cost of home exports in foreign country j, and this negative e¤ect can be engineered to overwhelm the bene…cial e¤ect of a reduced home tari¤ on exports from foreign country j. The government of foreign country j thus experiences a welfare loss, despite the fact that its exports from foreign country j confront a lower home-country tari¤.
To understand how the home government and the government of foreign country i can gain from this maneuver, recall that in this case the governments of the foreign countries each desire greater trade, given the world price, while the government of the home country does not. The home government, however, will accept a greater bilateral trade volume if this comes with an improved terms of trade. In a bilateral negotiation, this can be accomplished if the government of foreign country i reduces its tari¤ "more" than does the government of the home country (corresponding to a move into the lens in Figure 3A) .
Consider next Figure 3B . Here the government of the home country seeks a reduced tari¤ and more trade volume at the given world price, while the government of each foreign country seeks less trade volume. In this case, the government of the home country will accept less bilateral trade volume as part of a bilateral trade agreement, if the volume reduction comes with an improved terms of trade. This will be the case, if the home country's tari¤ increases "more" than does that of foreign country i. As a consequence of this bilateral maneuver, foreign country j experiences a terms of trade loss and a consequent welfare decline. In this way, the upward lens represents a gain that the governments of the home country and foreign country i may enjoy at the expense of the government of foreign country j. In the absence of bindings, therefore, this tari¤ vector is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism. On the other hand, in the presence of a bindings restriction, ¿ cannot be increased, and hence the tari¤ vector is not vulnerable. Therefore, for MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vectors at which the home government seeks more trade volume at the given world price, there is a bilateral opportunism problem if and only if bindings are absent.
Finally, consider Figure 3C . In this case, the home government achieves its preferred trade volume at the given world price, and e¢ciency then requires as well that at least one of the foreign governments, say j, must achieve its preferred trade volume at the given world price as well. The top panel of the …gure depicts the case in which foreign government i seeks greater trade volume at the given world price. The governments of the home country and foreign country i then face circumstances analogous to those of the home country and foreign country i in Figure 3A , and thus there is a bilateral opportunism problem with or without bindings. The middle panel of Figure 3C depicts the case in which foreign government i seeks reduced trade volume at the given world price, and here the governments of the home country and foreign country i face circumstances analogous to those of the home country and foreign country i in Figure 3B . Consequently, there is then a bilateral opportunism problem if and only if bindings are absent. Finally, the bottom panel of Figure 3C depicts the case in which foreign government i also achieves its preferred trade volume at the given world price. This is the case of MFN politically optimal tari¤s. As the bottom panel of Figure 3C makes clear, the MFN politically optimal tari¤ vector exhibits no lens, and hence it is not vulnerable to bilateral opportunism whether or not bindings are imposed. Hence, for MFN politically optimal tari¤s, there is no bilateral opportunism problem, regardless of the presence of bindings.
We may now state: As Proposition 8 indicates, the MFN rule on its own o¤ers only a partial solution to the bilateral opportunism problem. In the absence of bindings, the MFN rule guarantees that exactly one MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vector is protected from bilateral opportunism; and even when the MFN rule is joined with a bindings restriction, a subset of MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vectors (namely, those in which the government of the home country seeks less trade volume at …xed world prices) remain vulnerable. As a general matter, then, if the welfare of non-participating governments is to be protected, the rules of bilateral negotiation must be strengthened beyond the MFN (plus bindings) requirement. By contrast, if the MFN rule were combined with the reciprocity rule, then the welfare of the non-participating government would be preserved in the face of any bilateral agreement, and so no MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vector would be vulnerable to bilateral opportunism. In terms of Figures 3A-3C , reciprocity restricts bilateral negotiations between the domestic government and the government of foreign country i to remain along the iso-W ¤j (equivalently, iso-e p w ) locus, which never enters the lens between them. When joined with Proposition 8, this observation suggests that the principle of reciprocity serves to enhance signi…cantly the power of the principle of non-discrimination in dealing with bilateral opportunism.
Non-violation Nulli…cation-or-Impairment
While we have above modeled MFN and reciprocity as formal and rigid rules, their application in GATT/WTO practice is more quali…ed. But non-participant welfare may also be protected through other GATT/WTO provisions. We analyze here the potential role of GATT Article XXIII non-violation nulli…cation-orimpairment complaints in protecting non-participant welfare. 21 We ask whether the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule might provide a separate defense against bilateral opportunism, even when the reciprocity and MFN rules are not imposed.
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Our analysis requires a de…nition of market access. To begin, we thus return to the underlying model in Section 2. Consider a given vector of tari¤s, ¿ : Using the linkage condition (2.1) 
For a given vector of tari¤s ¿ , the market access that the domestic country a¤ords to foreign country j at world price p wj then may be de…ned as:
where p´p(¿ j ; p wj ). 23 E¤ectively, this amounts to the "residual" import demand 21 Nulli…cation-or-impairment complaints may be lodged under Article XXIII, if it is alleged that an explicit GATT rule (e.g., MFN) has been broken ("violation complaints") and even if no such allegation is made ("non-violation complaints"). In practice, when a measure is found to be GATT-illegal, it is presumed to cause nulli…cation or impairment, and thus for a successful violation complaint no further conditions are required (see, e.g., Roessler, 1997, p. 129) . We describe in the Introduction the conditions that must be met for a successful non-violation complaint (see, e.g., Petersmann, 1997, p. 162) , and it is on this possibility that we focus. 22 A second reason for considering non-violation nulli…cation-or-impairment provisions in the context of bilateral opportunism problems is that new complications arise when many goods are considered. In our working paper (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999c) , we show that MFN and reciprocity continue to solve the terms-of-trade driven bilateral opportunism problem, but an additional problem of bilateral opportunism (associated with local price movements) may still arise under these rules in limited circumstances. In this light, a limited role for non-violation complaints could arise in a many-good setting even if reciprocity and MFN were rigidly applied. 23 We may similarly de…ne the market access that foreign country j a¤ords to exporters from the domestic country at world price p wj . This is given simply by foreign country j 0 s import demand at p wj in light of its tari¤
faced by exporters from foreign country j at ¿ and p wj . Note that the marketclearing condition (2.4) now may be rewritten equivalently as:
Under market clearing, the market access that the domestic country o¤ers exporters from foreign country j equals the export supply from foreign country j. We next observe a relationship between changes in the terms of trade and changes in market access. In a two-country model, the Marshall-Lerner (global) stability condition ensures that an inward shift of the domestic import demand curve at every world price results in a lower equilibrium world price. We assume the analogous stability condition in our three-country model. 24 In a discriminatory setting, this means that a reduction in the market access that the domestic country a¤ords to foreign country j at every p wj -engineered with any combination of changes in (¿ i ; ¿ j ) and ¿ ¤i -results in a lower e p wj . In an MFN environment, this means that a reduction in the market access that the domestic country a¤ords to foreign country j at every p w -engineered with any combination of changes in ¿ and ¿ ¤i -results in a lower e p w . In both environments, the Marshall-Lerner stability condition ensures that, for a given vector of tari¤s, the equilibrium world price (i.e., the world price that satis…es (6.2)) is uniquely determined.
We now return to our consideration of bilateral negotiations, and consider the possible role of non-violation nulli…cation-or-impairment complaints in preventing the problem of bilateral opportunism. As detailed in GATT Article XXIII, these complaints can be lodged when a government believes that market access it had previously won through negotiations is subsequently denied unexpectedly as a result of measures taken by its negotiating partner. In principle the ability to bring such complaints could prevent the domestic country and foreign country i from negotiating in a way which reclaimed from foreign country j a portion of the domestic market access that country j had previously negotiated. More formally, we may say that bilateral negotiations between the domestic country and foreign country i satisfy the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule whenever
3) 24 Formally, in a two-country setting the Marshall-Lerner stability condition requires that, at the equilibrium world price, the elasticity of the home-country's import demand must be less than the elasticity of the foreign country's export supply. We impose here the analogous condition that, at the equilibrium world price de…ned by (6.2), the elasticity of the market access that the home-country a¤ords to foreign country j must be less than the elasticity of foreign country j's export supply.
But under our stability condition, bilateral negotiations between the domestic country and foreign country i that satisfy the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule in discriminatory environments must not diminish e p wj , while under the MFN rule such negotiations must not diminish e p w . As movement into the lens described in Figure 2 requires a diminished e p wj , while movement into the lens' described by 3A, 3B and 3C all require a diminished e p w , it follows that, beginning from the e¢ciency frontier, all opportunistic bilateral agreements are indeed precluded under the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule. That is, starting from an e¢cient set of tari¤s, any bilateral agreement that is attractive to the home country and foreign country i would violate the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule. Thus we have:
Proposition 9 (Nulli…cation-or-Impairment Rule and E¢cient Tari¤s): Under the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule, no e¢cient tari¤ vector is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism.
Using Proposition 9, we have a formal basis from which to interpret the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule as playing a potentially important role in solving the bilateral opportunism problem, regardless of whether the MFN and/or reciprocity rules are present. But the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule would by itself be a cumbersome solution to a problem which, as Proposition 5 indicates, is pervasive. In this light, we may conclude from Propositions 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 that MFN and reciprocity together can provide a …rst line of defense against the prospect of bilateral agreements that appropriate welfare from non-participants. The nulli…cation-or-impairment rule can then be understood as providing a second line of defense against the prospect of non-participant welfare appropriation, as it need only be invoked when a bilateral negotiation does not conform with each of these principles.
Conclusion
Trade negotiations occur over time between many governments. Given the ongoing nature of such negotiations, a government may naturally fear that the extent of market access that it has secured in a current negotiation may be diminished in a future negotiation to which it is not party. Indeed, if a government recognizes the potential for an opportunistic bilateral negotiation in the future, then it may be unwilling to o¤er signi…cant concessions in a current negotiation. As this discussion suggests, the degree to which the rules of a multilateral trading system protect through time the value of concessions is of central importance to the functioning of the system.
In this paper, we o¤er a formal analysis that characterizes the scope for opportunistic bilateral agreements under di¤erent negotiation rules. Our main …nding is that the welfare of a non-participating government is preserved in the presence of any bilateral agreement that respects the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination. We thus argue that reciprocity and non-discrimination, two of the central pillars of the GATT/WTO architecture, constitute a powerful …rst-line of defense against the potential for opportunistic bilateral agreements.
We consider as well the possibilities for opportunism under weaker rules. We …nd that the potential for opportunistic bilateral agreements is severe when there are no rules: every e¢cient tari¤ vector is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism in the absence of rules for bilateral negotiation. In addition, we …nd that the possibility of bilateral opportunism remains when either reciprocity or non-discrimination (but not both) is imposed. Of particular interest, non-discrimination without reciprocity o¤ers at best a partial solution to the bilateral opportunism problem: when tari¤s on non-participants are bound, the non-discrimination principle ensures that many -but certainly not all -MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vectors are not vulnerable to bilateral opportunism. Thus, while our results con…rm the general point raised by Schwartz and Sykes (1997) that the non-discrimination principle is bene…cial as a means to protect the value of past concessions, our formal analysis reveals that this principle fully solves the bilateral opportunism problem only when it is applied in combination with the principle of reciprocity.
The …ndings here suggest that reciprocity, which is often maligned as a mercantilist distraction, in fact serves a key role in trade negotiations when exercised in the presence of non-discrimination. At the same time, preferential tari¤ agreements, which are permitted under the special exception to MFN granted by GATT's Article XXIV, represent a possible route to opportunistic bilateral agreements. In this light, preferential tari¤ agreements may present a natural and appropriate target for non-violation nulli…cation-or-impairment complaints, and the ability to bring such complaints through Article XXIII may in turn play an important role in diminishing the attractiveness of preferential agreements as a route to bilateral opportunism. More generally, our analysis suggests that the potential for nulli…cation-or-impairment complaints can constitute a valuable second-line of defense against bilateral opportunism.
Appendix
The Two-Good General-Equilibrium Model of Trade:
The import and export functions for foreign country i may be derived as follows. Production is determined by the local relative price:
Consumption is a function of the local relative price -which de…nes the trade-o¤ faced by consumers and determines the level and distribution of factor income in the economy -and of tari¤ revenue R ¤i , which is distributed lump-sum to the consumers in foreign country i and which we measure in units of their export good y at local prices: Consider next the home country. Domestic production is determined by the local price: Q k = Q k (p) for k = x; y. Domestic consumption of each good is likewise determined as a function of the local price and domestic tari¤ revenue: D k (p; R) for k = x; y, where tari¤ revenue is distributed lump-sum to domestic consumers and measured in units of the domestic export good x in local prices. Using the de…nition of T , home tari¤ revenue may be represented as follows: or R = R(p; T ). We now may represent the domestic country's consumption as C k (p; T )´D k (p; R(p; T )) for k = x; y: Home-country imports of x thus may be denoted as M (p; T )´C x (p; T ) ¡ Q x (p); while home-country exports of y may be represented as E(p; T )´Q y (p) ¡ C y (p; T ):
Proof of Proposition 7 (MFN-E¢cient Tari¤s): To prove this proposition, we …rst identify some general relationships and then establish three lemmas. Here and throughout the Appendix, we denote partial derivatives by subscripts. We observe that for every i; j 2 f1; 2g with i 6 = j, we have: ¤2 ¿ ¤2 = 0: As we observed in the text discussion following Proposition 7, cases (i), (ii) and (iii) correspond to the cases in which the home government, respectively, seeks less, seeks more or achieves its desired trade volume at the given world price. In terms of our representation of government objective functions, these cases correspond to the conditions that: W p > 0, W p < 0 and W p = 0. To characterize the MFN-e¢ciency frontier, we proceed exhaustively through these three cases. Our …ndings are summarized in the following three lemmas:
Lemma A1: Suppose W p > 0 at an MFN-e¢cient set of tari¤s. Then, for every i 2 f1; 2g, and i 6 = j,
